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Managerial Payoff and Gift–Exchange in the Field
1 Introduction
Firms must regularly address the problem of providing incentives to employees when actions
are not at all or hardly contractible. The standard approach in economics has been to
focus on analyzing the optimal explicit incentive schemes: tying the level of the worker’s
compensation to the amount of output produced, which serves as a (noisy) measure of
employee effort.1 However, the importance of fairness and social preferences – especially
for the work relationship – has long been documented. Starting with Akerlof (1982), a
literature has developed that considers gift–exchange as an alternative source of incentives
in the workplace. According to this gift–exchange theory, firms can induce above–minimal
effort from agents – even in the absence of explicit pay–for–performance incentives – since
such–inclined agents may reciprocate generous wage payments with higher effort exertion: A
positive wage–effort relationship takes effect as workers repay the initial “gift” of a generous
wage with a “return gift” of above–minimum effort.
Recently there have been conflicting results on the significance of gift–exchange as a mo-
tivating force outside of the lab. While some papers have found a robust pattern of gift-
exchange in field settings, others have failed to find the positive relationship of initial and
return gift at all or have documented only effects that persist for very short periods; cf.
DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, and Rao (2016). The varying effectiveness of gift–exchange
in different settings suggests that the efficacy of gift–exchange incentives depends on details
of the environment. We add to this research by providing results that suggest an avenue
to reconcile those findings: In our field experiment we do not find evidence for an over-
all positive effort response merely from an initial wage gift. However, the gift’s efficacy is
substantially improved if the manager benefits more strongly from a worker’s high effort.
That is, gift–exchange can induce effort if workers are able to repay the gift to the manager.
Moreover, we document that gift–exchange works more effectively with subjects that we
1An extensive theoretical literature – e.g., Holmstro¨m (1979) or Grossman and Hart (1983) – has empha-
sized the importance of strong monetary incentives to induce effort.
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classify as reciprocal via a personality test,2 and that the efficacy of gift–exchange does not
dissipate over the course of the experiment. We conclude from our results that while gift–
exchange may not be effective as an incentive in all settings, it can be a powerful incentive
device in the proper job context: such as in our setting when managers have performance-
related incentives, and when it is directed to the right employees, who are most likely to be
reciprocal.
For our field experiment we hired temporary workers for a data entry job.3 The workers
entered historical data from the 1849 Prussian Census. In total we had 59 workers entering
data during a five hour shift in the Harvard Business School computer lab where the data
entry took place. The job was advertised to the worker by a temp worker agency at the
standard hourly wage of $13; however for 30 of the workers we increased the hourly wage
to $18 upon their arrival. We explained to all of the workers that we were hired by two
professors to organize the entry of these data. For 15 workers in each of the $13 and the $18
groups we emphasized the importance of them working hard for us by explaining that we
would receive a bonus of 50% if the job was done ‘by the end of the week’ (Bonus treatment).
For the ‘control’ groups in both of the $13 and the $18 conditions we did not inform the
workers of this bonus (No Bonus treatment). We also asked the workers to fill out a short
version of the “Big 5” personality test, to give us a measure of non-cognitive skills.4
In line with previous field experiments, we do not find an effort increase in response to the
higher wage in the No Bonus treatment. However, for the workers in the Bonus treatment,
a higher wage leads to a significant increase in worker output. Hence, there is a strong
complementarity between the wage gift and the resulting payoff for the manager.5 Further-
2We were, in 2007, among the first to take seriously the documented heterogeneity in the population
along the reciprocity dimension and to test a key tenet of reciprocity models: that treatment effects should
be brought about by reciprocal subjects.
3On a more methodological level we think this paper was, at the time of writing in 2007, the first to
recruit subjects for a natural field experiment via a temp worker agency and to exploit additional data that
could be garnered from this specific subject pool.
4The “Big 5” personality factors capture five distinct aspects of an individual’s personality: extraversion;
agreeablenes; conscientiousness; emotional stability; and imagination. These factors are typically measured
by having subjects agree or disagree with an extensive series of statements.
5This result is akin to the findings that are summarized in Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) on the comple-
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more, when we separate workers based on their agreeableness (a personality trait associated
with standard lab measures of reciprocity), we find that the positive effect of high wages
on effort is driven entirely by highly agreeable (strong positive reciprocity) workers, with
low reciprocity workers showing either a zero or a negative response to a higher wage. We
consider the finding that the strength of gift–exchange is positively correlated with measures
of reciprocal inclination as absolutely necessary to lend credibility to gift–exchange based
explanations of motivation in the labor market. Though apparently obvious, to the best of
our knowledge this study was, at the time of writing it in 2007/08, the first to document
this fact in the field.
We also examine the strength of the gift–exchange response over time. In contrast to other
studies, e.g. Gneezy and List (2006), we find no weakening of positive responses to wage gifts
over time. To the contrary, any negative effects of the wage gift disappear in the later stages
of the task, and we find an overall strongly positive effect of our treatment manipulations in
the second half of the experiment.
We use two different measures of effort in our analysis: gross data entered, and an error–
corrected measure of data entered. The estimates that were derived from these two measures
are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar, which suggests that any effort responses
work along the quantity margin only; the responses leave the quality margin of effort unaf-
fected.6
We can rationalize these results with an agency model that captures reciprocal preferences,
where we show that there is complementarity between gift and ability to repay the gift. In
the model a risk–neutral firm hires a risk–averse worker to exert non–contractible effort.
The novel feature of the model is that the worker is reciprocal: the worker’s utility increases
in the principal’s profit whenever the worker receives a rent in excess of his outside option.
Thus, when the firm is generous to the worker by giving him additional compensation, the
worker desires to provide in turn something of value to the firm. The worker’s reciprocal
mentarities among various HR policy instruments.
6This is in contrast to Kim and Slonim (2009), who find gift–exchange mainly along the quality margin.
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attitude can now be used by the firm to align the worker’s preferences with those of the
firm, which thus generates intrinsic motivation. The comparative statics show that ceteris
paribus the worker’s optimal effort choice increases in the initial wage gift and his ability
to repay the gift. The corresponding cross derivative is also positive, which indicates the
complementarity of the instruments.
An extensive body of evidence has developed that demonstrates reciprocal behavior and
gift–exchange in laboratory experiments. Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) summarize results from
earlier studies and highlight several key results: i) Average wages in the experiments are
above the minimal wages and leave workers with rents; ii) There is a positive wage-effort
relationship; and iii) These results are robust to various institutions, to competition, and
to high stakes.7 The laboratory experiment by Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach, and Sadrieh
(2010) is closely related to our paper. Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach, and Sadrieh (2010)
present a real-effort laboratory experiment and show that a positive wage–effort relation as
implied by gift–exchange prevails only if information on the manager’s surplus is provided to
the experimental workers. This indicates – as is predicted by our model – that the manager’s
surplus is an important determinant of the effectiveness of gift–exchange relations. Note,
however, that Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach, and Sadrieh (2010) do not vary the surplus
accruing to the manager nor do they collect the additional information necessary to test our
hypotheses.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a comprehensive overview of the vast set of
excellent papers on gift–exchange that have been written in the last decade. See DellaVigna,
List, Malmendier, and Rao (2016) or Esteves-Sorenson (2018) for excellent overviews of this
literature. These two papers also address the controversial discussion about the validity
of the lab results for gift–exchange in the field. We take the mixed findings of these field
studies as evidence that the efficacy of gift–exchange depends on subtle details of the field
situation. While Falk (2007) finds strong evidence for gift–exchange in a field experiment
7For further reference see also Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and the references
therein.
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with charitable donations, Gneezy and List (2006) argue that the effect of gift–exchange
in the field is only minor, fast disappearing, and overall not a viable employment strategy.
In Gneezy and List, students are hired for a day job in a library, and half of them get a
surprise rise of their hourly pay. Gneezy and List document that, other than in our field
experiment, there is only a short lived effect of this gift on the students’ effort. Overall the
‘firm’ would have fared better hiring more students for the lower wage rate.Kube, Marechal,
and Puppe (2013) replicate the Gneezy and List study and also find no effect of a wage gift
but document a strong negative effect in response to a wage cut. In a comparable design,
Kube, Puppe, and Marechal (2012) document a strong positive effect of non-monetary gifts,
such as wrapped thermos bottles, on students’ effort. Note that in neither of these cases
were the subjects given any indication that the manager who provided the higher wage would
benefit directly from increased productivity and the performed jobs were not ones where an
employee would expect such a compensation structure. Becker, Messer, and Wolter (2012)
study a field experiment where a random sub-sample of participants in the Swiss Labor Force
Survey received vouchers for training courses. The authors find evidence for long–term (six
months) gift–exchange, as voucher recipients are more likely to participate in future survey
waves. As the authors can track actual voucher redemption, they are able to document that
this long-lasting gift–exchange relationship is most pronounced for the sub-group that had
redeemed their vouchers.
In light of the above studies, the current study makes two contributions: On the one hand,
as we also elicit measures of ability and personality traits, we were in 2007/2008 (to the best
of our knowledge) the first to document the heterogeneity of the effect of gift–exchange across
different types of employees. On the other hand, we add to the two “standard” features of a
gift–exchange experiment – a surprise higher wage offer and the possibility for the worker to
reciprocate by exerting more effort – the information that the task matters to the researchers
and that the “managers” stand to benefit from a job that is well done by receiving a bonus.
Hence, we believe, the fact that gift–exchange is supposed to be at work is very salient for
the workers. This, in turn, offers a good reason for why the initial wage gift is given and
5
Managerial Payoff and Gift–Exchange in the Field
what the appropriate reaction to the gift is. In some of the above studies this is clear to
employees due to the circumstances, but sometimes it is not (as in Gneezy and List (2006)
where the wage increase comes as a surprise); hence it is not clear why subjects should be
contextually aware of the fact that they are engaged in a gift–exchange relationship and that
exerting more effort is in fact appropriate.
Bellemare and Shearer (2009) analyze gift–exchange within a real firm (where the value
of output is clear to the workers). In their study, there is a surprise bonus for the workers
in a tree planting firm in British Columbia. Their results indicate a 10% increase in worker
productivity on average which slowly dwindles. Moreover the effect of the gift is more marked
if the worker has been with the firm for longer. Hence, Bellemare and Shearer argue that
spot–market field experiments only establish a lower bound of the effects of gift–exchange
in real firms that are characterized by longstanding and ongoing relations that amplify the
effects. Based on data from the same firm, Bellemare and Shearer (2011) develop a structural
behavioral model to identify a worker’s optimal response to monetary wage gifts. They use
data from two separate field experiments to estimate the model and simulate how workers
would react to different wage gifts. They find that profit-maximizing gifts would increase
profits under slack labor market conditions by up to 10% on average.
The key innovation of the current study was to take seriously an immediate implication
of reciprocity based gift–exchange models; the importance of the ability of the agent to
repay the gift to the principal. According to the recent comprehensive study by DellaVigna,
List, Malmendier, and Rao (2016), there are only three other studies, next that address this
issue: Englmaier and Leider (2012b); Kessler (2013); and DellaVigna, List, Malmendier,
and Rao (2016). Englmaier and Leider (2012b) also analyze the importance of the ability
of the worker to “repay the gift” to the manager in a real-effort laboratory experiment
where they vary the wage and the effect of the worker’s effort on the manager’s payoff.
They report results that are consistent with the core findings of the current study plus
additional predictions about which is the marginal worker (in terms of ability) affected by
their experimental variation and how different types of individuals – selfish and reciprocal
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– react to it. Kessler (2013) uses a laboratory experiment and finds, consistent with our
results, that gift–exchange is more prevalent when worker effort is more efficient. Finally,
as part of a rich set of findings, DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, and Rao (2016) document
in a large scale natural field experiment that the return of effort to the employer – as is
predicted by this study or Englmaier and Leider (2012a) – positively affects the efficacy of
gift–exchange.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the design of
the field experiment. Section 3 derives the theoretical predictions and Sections 4 and 5
present and discuss the results. Section 6 concludes. Appendices B - A contain derivations,
additional tables, and illustrations.
2 Experimental Design
The field experiment took place on the premises of the CLER lab at the Harvard Business
School, where we provided subjects with computer work stations. We ran four sessions in
September 2007. Though subjects were situated within one room, the layout was such that
they could not monitor each other’s work progress. Moreover, though we did not formally
forbid communication, we did not note any signs of more than casual communication. Hence
we conclude that there is only very limited scope for peer effects to affect our results. In total
we had 59 participants; each of them worked for approximately five hours on a single day.
The participants were hired via a temp worker agency that regularly works with the Harvard
Business School.8 We told the temp workers that we had been hired to organize a data entry
project. These workers frequently work on similar data entry projects; hence there is no
reason to believe that they suspected they were participating in a field experiment. Their
8Atrium Staffing of Boston, http://www.atriumstaff.com/, described (as of 2007) their services as follows:
“Since 1995, Atrium’s Office Support Practice has been the firm’s stronghold. Our team of skilled recruiters,
who themselves draw from diverse career backgrounds, are experts in identifying administrative talent and
understanding client needs. Our thorough screening processes ensure that we know our Associates well. Our
customized approach to client searches results in impressive hire retention rates of over 93%. We staff direct
hire, temp-to-hire and temporary administrative roles in a variety of companies.”
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job was to enter data from the 1849 Prussian Census into an Excel template.9
We created four treatment cells – Low Wage/No Bonus, High Wage/No Bonus, Low
Wage/Bonus, High Wage/Bonus – based on the wage level and the bonus information.
Workers were either paid the standard wage ($13/hr) as advertised by the temp agency, or
were “surprised” with a higher wage ($18/hr).10 In the baseline No Bonus treatments, we
told the participants only that we were hired “by two professors to organize the entry of
these data”. In the Bonus treatment groups we additionally inform the temps that we get a
substantial “completion bonus” if enough work gets done.11 These “bonus” treatments indi-
cate whether the worker is willing to expend effort that benefits. Assignment of participants
into one of the treatment cells was random and executed by the temp agency.
From the temp agency we get demographic information: the gender, race, age, work ex-
perience, and student status of the workers, which we use as controls. Most important, we
have a measure of the workers’ typing speeds (Typing Score), which we use to control for the
temp workers’ differing typing abilities. This is a key determinant for productivity in this
task. The final payment of the temp workers was done in cash directly at the end of each
entry session.
Given that there are no previous papers that use this task or treatment variation, we were
not able to calibrate the magnitude of the pay rise and the completion bonus in order to find
the optimal combination to maximize gift–exchange; consequently our results should not
be seen as an upper bound on the efficacy of reciprocal incentives. However, we are fairly
certain that all participants considered the pay rise and completion bonus as “substantial”.
9An example from the 1849 Prussian Census can be found in Figure C.1 in Appendix A.
10Note that in principle this is a setting where effort could be motivated by paying a piece rate as suggested
by the classic moral hazard literature; cf. Holmstro¨m (1979). However, this is not done by the temp agency
we work with. Hence, also below in the model, we will treat effort as not contractible (due to constraints on
the contracting space).
11In order to not deceive the subjects on this issue we arranged with one of the providers of the Prussian
Census Data, Sascha Becker, to put such an incentive scheme in place. Our actual “completion bonus” came
in the form of free lunch and was worth roughly $10.
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3 A Model of Reciprocal Motivation
Our experiment is not designed to differentiate exactly between different models of social
preferences. Hence we do not interpret our findings as a strict test of our model, but rather
consider the model to be a valuable frame within which to organize the data. We consider
a simplified version of the model in Englmaier and Leider (2012a) where we solve the full
moral hazard problem and derive the structure of the optimal contract in a standard principal
agent problem with reciprocal agents. To lay out our model: We assume that there is a risk
neutral manager who wants to maximize expected profits and one risk averse worker who
cares about reciprocity. The worker can take an action (effort) a ≥ 0 with corresponding
costs of effort c (a), with: c′ (a) > 0, c′ (0) = 0; and c′′ (a) > 0.
The actions imply a respective expected return for the manager ER(a) with ER′(a) >
0, ER′′(a) ≤ 0. In order to capture our experimental variation we introduce the scalar M
which reflects the monetary value of output: M · ER(a) is the expected monetary gross
return for the manager from action a.
A contract (w, aˆ) is a fixed wage payment w, as well as an unenforceable request for an
action aˆ. In a real–world context we could think of aˆ as an informal job description or a code
of conduct. In the experiment we will interpret aˆ as an exogenously given and commonly
understood norm. Given our focus here on changes in behavior these details are not key to
our results. While aˆ is not binding, it serves to fix the worker’s beliefs about the manager’s
intended generosity (since the expected utility of a contract depends on the worker’s action).
The worker’s inherent concern for reciprocity is measured by η ∈ [0,+∞). The worker’s
utility function – given that she takes action a, under the contract (w˜, aˆ) – is given by
U (w˜, a, aˆ) = u(w˜)− c(a) + η (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯) ·M · (ER(a)− w˜) , (1)
where u¯ is the worker’s outside option in the labor market. The utility function capture –
albeit in a simplistic form – the core idea of reciprocal motivation: If an individual has been
9
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treated kindly, she will want to reciprocate in kind.12 The function consists of three parts:
i) utility from the monetary wage payment u(w˜); ii) effort costs c (a) ; and iii) reciprocal
utility η (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯)M ·(ER(a)− w˜) , where η measures the intensity of the reciprocal
preferences.
A “generous” contract is one that provides a rent to the worker: an expected monetary
utility in excess of the worker’s outside option. A more generous contract will induce the
worker to feel more reciprocal, which here means that she will derive greater marginal and
absolute utility from the manager’s profit. On the assumption that the contract is generous,
the worker’s optimal effort choice a∗ for a given contract is implicitly defined by the first
order condition
∂U (w˜, a, aˆ)
∂a
= −c′(a∗) + η (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯)M · ER′(a∗) = 0. (2)
Applying the implicit function theorem we can derive the relevant comparative statics
w.r.t. w˜ and M : They are positive, as is the cross partial w.r.t. w˜ and M , which indicates
that they are complements.13 Note that – sinceM and η (the concern for reciprocity) always
appear together – the effect of varying η is the same as the effect of varyingM . The following
Lemma 1 summarizes these results.
Lemma 1 (Reciprocity). For a generous contract, (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯) > 0, the worker’s
optimal action a∗ is implicitly defined by the first order condition
∂U (w˜, a, aˆ)
∂a
= −c′(a∗) + η (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯) ·M · ER′(a∗) = 0. (3)
It is increasing in w˜. ∂a
∗
∂w˜
> 0; increasing in M : ∂a
∗
∂M
> 0; increasing in η: ∂a
∗
∂η
> 0; and w˜
and M are complements: ∂
2a∗
∂w˜∂M
> 0.
The intuition for the complementarity is fairly straightforward from the utility function:
12Rabin (1993), for simultaneous move games, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2006), for sequential games, have developed powerful and general models of reciprocal preferences.
13See Appendix B for the derivations and a parameterized example.
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Increasing the wage leaves a larger rent to the worker and increases the weight that she
gives to the managers welfare. Due to the multiplicative structure, the worker finds it more
attractive to work harder when she has a stronger impact on the manager’s surplus.
In contrast to the standard model of preferences (η = 0) the first–order condition simplifies
to
∂U (w˜, a, aˆ)
∂a
= −c′(a∗) < 0, (4)
which is always negative, since with flat wages the worker’s utility unambiguously decreases
in her effort choice and her optimal action a∗standard is trivially given by a
∗
standard = 0. In-
creasing M or w˜ has no effect on a∗standard = 0. This is summarized in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 (Standard Preferences). . a∗Standard = 0, and the corresponding comparative
statics are trivially given by
∂a∗standard
∂M
= 0,
∂a∗standard
∂w˜
= 0,
∂2a∗standard
∂M∂w˜
= 0.
Summarizing the results from our model, we can formulate the following predictions that
we try to validate in our experimental analysis. The first three follow directly from Lemma
1:
Prediction 1. Effort is increasing in wage w˜.
Prediction 2. Effort is increasing in managerial payoff M .
Prediction 3. Managerial payoff and wage are complementary in their effect on effort,
∂a∗2
∂w˜∂M
> 0.
The next prediction is straightforward: Reciprocal incentives via gift–exchange work better
for more reciprocally inclined subjects. In particular, low reciprocity individuals should be
unlikely to exhibit a positive response to high wages, as their utility from providing effort
11
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for the principal is very low compared to their cost of effort. High–reciprocity individuals,
however, are more likely to have a sufficiently strong utility benefit from returning the gift
so as to induce effort.
Prediction 4. The positive effort response to a wage gift or a manager bonus is more
pronounced for more reciprocally inclined (higher η) subjects.
4 Experimental Results
Our main performance measure are the subjects’ data entry rates: the number of characters
of data entered per minute.14 As a robustness check, in our regressions we also report the
accuracy–corrected data entry rate.15 In Table 1 we present the mean and median entry
rates for the whole shift. Subjects’ overall productivity suggests that offering a high wage
in the No Bonus treatments had a negative impact on effort, while it had a positive effect
in the Bonus treatments. We test this effect statistically in the analysis that follows.
Figure 1 shows how productivity – measured in 10 minute intervals – evolves over time in
the four treatment conditions. Though the levels differ, there seems to be no difference in
the time trend. There is learning in all four treatments for the first hour, then productivity
is fairly flat until the end, where there is a steep drop in all treatments. This drop is mostly
’technical’: Subjects finished a line and did not start a new one that they were unlikely to
finish before the end of their shift.
As can be seen in Table 2 there are considerable differences in underlying ability (the typing
speed score) between treatments. Hence, a direct comparison of the overall productivity
14The Prussian Census has two volumes that differ slightly in their content: in particular, in the number
of cells/line and the average number of characters/cell. To control for these differences we convert the
number of cells (which is our basic measure of performance) into characters entered by weighting cells by the
average number of characters/cell in the respective volume. Alternatively, we can also directly control for
the volume by adding a dummy variable and keeping cells as the measure. These results are quantitatively
and qualitatively similar.
15To construct this measure we repeat the exercise used to construct the data entry rate, i.e. we convert
the number of correctly entered cells into characters entered by weighing cells with the average number of
characters/cell in the respective volume.
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Table 1: Data–Entry Rate (Chars/min) by Treatment
Employee Manager Data Entry Rate Accuracy Corrected Rate # of
Wage Bonus Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs.
$13/hour No 29.71 25.52 16.12 28.02 23.65 15.32 14
$18/hour No 23.47 19.83 11.47 21.92 19.42 10.57 15
$13/hour Yes 24.38 23.40 9.21 23.06 22.09 9.11 15
$18/hour Yes 28.36 29.25 8.42 26.72 27.48 8.24 15
The table shows the average data–entry rate, measured as characters/minute (Data–Entry Rate) or as
correct characters/minute (Accuracy–Corrected Rate), as well as the median rate and the standard
deviation classified by treatment.
Table 2: Typing Score
Employee Manager Typing Score # of
Wage Bonus Mean Median St. Dev. Obs.
$13/hour No 57,93 52,50 17,46 14
$18/hour No 48,80 46,00 13,97 15
$13/hour Yes 48,27 48,00 14,35 15
$18/hour Yes 56,20 53,00 16,83 15
The table shows the average Typing Score as provided by the temp agency, as well as the median rate and
the standard deviation broken up by treatment.
between treatments is somewhat misleading. We address this below by directly controlling
for ability in our main regressions.
Regression Analysis of Treatment Effects
Our sample size in terms of participating subjects is only somewhat bigger than in preceding
studies: e.g., Gneezy and List (2006) or Bellemare and Shearer (2009); but importantly,
our design allows us to use detailed additional information to estimate more precisely the
treatment effects. Most importantly we have a measure of data–entry ability from the temp
agency. The agency has temp workers take a typing speed test upon hiring, and the agency
made this information available to us. Since Table 2 indicates substantial heterogeneity in
13
Managerial Payoff and Gift–Exchange in the Field
Figure 1: Performance over Time
The x-axis shows the 10 minute sub-periods and the y-axis shows the average data entry rates
(characters/minute) by treatment. $13/Low refers to the $13 Wage/No Bonus treatment., $18/Low refers
to the $18 Wage/No Bonus treatment, etc.
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the underlying ability distribution across treatments we proceed by including controls for
worker ability. Additionally, we have worker productivity in our task at 10–minute and 30–
minute intervals. We will use the 10–minute data as the units of observation in this paper.
The results for the 30–minute data are quantitatively similar but less precisely estimated
and are available upon request.16 Table 3 presents the results of a GLS estimate with a
heteroskedastic panel structure and AR(1) errors. A Wooldridge test for serial correlation
finds significant autocorrelation (p < 0.001) while a Likelihood Ratio test suggests panel
heteroskedasticity (p < 0.001).
The two alternate effort measures presented in specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3 give
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar estimates, which suggests that the response to
the treatment variations does not affect quality but only influences the quantity margin.
Contrary to the fundamental gift–exchange intuition, we find a significant and negative
effect of the wage gift on effort and no significant effect of the manager bonus. However, the
interaction High Wage X Manager Bonus is significantly positive and large in size, which
results in an overall positive gift–exchange in the Bonus treatment: The effect of a wage
gift depends importantly on the characteristics of the job context, and there is a strong
complementarity between the wage gift and the magnitude of the managerial payoff.17
Treatment Effects by Agreeableness
As we have information on workers’ scores in a “Big 5” personality test, we can analyze
how effects vary along this dimension. The “Big 5” personality factors capture five distinct
16Gneezy and List (2006) and Kim and Slonim (2009) use the same units of observation. Our performance
measure is constructed from information when whole lines of the census were finished. These lines took
several minutes to be completely entered. To smooth our data, we proceed as follows: If a line was started
x minutes before the end of the n-th 10 minute sub-period and finished in the y-th minute of the (n+1)-th
10 minute sub-period, we account x/(x+y) of the characters of this line to the n-th and y/(x+y) of the
characters of this line to the (n+1)-th 10 minute sub-period.
17Relaxing our specification by allowing for non-linear effects of ability, we estimate a specification with
separate dummy variables for the lowest, middle, and highest terciles of ability. In this analysis, we find
very similar coefficients and present them in Table C.1 in Appendix C. Note that the results in Table C.1
suggest non-linear effects of ability with the middle tercile not being different from the top tercile but the
bottom tercile being significantly slower.
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Table 3: Regression: Performance (10–min. Periods)
(1) (2)
Data Entry Accuracy
VARIABLES Rate Corrected Rate
Typing Speed Test Score 0.220*** 0.203***
(0.0272) (0.0259)
Temps Paid High Wage -3.531*** -3.355***
(1.118) (1.063)
Manager Bonus -1.526 -0.994
(1.357) (1.303)
High Wage X Manager Bonus 6.456*** 5.824***
(1.731) (1.665)
Period 0.105*** 0.0700**
(0.0359) (0.0344)
Demographic Controls YES YES
Constant 17.46*** 11.71**
(5.266) (5.006)
Observations 1628 1628
Number of subjects 57 57
Total Effect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 2.925** 2.469**
(1.214) (1.168)
We report cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure and AR(1)
correlation. Demographic Controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and
student status. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p <0.1
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aspects of an individual’s personality: extraversion; agreeableness ; conscientiousness ; emo-
tional stability (also referred to as its inverse, neuroticism); and imagination (or openness
to experience). The five factors are typically measured by having subjects read a series of
statements, such as “I pay attention to details”, and rate them on a scale from “strongly
agree” to “strongly disagree”, where each statement is associated with one of the factors.
Extraversion represents an individual’s sociability and engagement with the external world.
Extraverts are commonly seen as energetic and action oriented. Extraversion is positively
associated with scale items such as “I am the life of the party” and negatively associated
with items such as “I don’t talk a lot.” Agreeableness represents an individual’s interest
in social harmony and getting along with others. Agreeable individuals are seen as helpful,
trusting and optimistic. Agreeableness is positively associated with items such as “I take
time out for others” and negatively associated with items such as “I am not interested in
other people’s problems.” Conscientiousness represents an individual’s self-discipline and
inclination to follow rules and instructions. Conscientious people are seen as honest, hard-
working, able to control their impulses, and inclined to plan. Conscientiousness is positively
associated with scale items such as “I am always prepared” and negatively associated with
items such as “I shirk my duties.” Emotional stability reflects an individual’s calmness and
low propensity to feel negative emotions. Conversely, neurotic individuals are emotionally
reactive to stress and frustration, inclined towards a bad mood and anxiety. Emotional
stability is positively associated with scale items such as “I am relaxed most of the time”
and negatively associated with items such as “I worry about things.” Finally, imagination
represents an individual’s attraction to unusual ideas, adventure, artistic expression and a
variety of experiences. Imaginative people are seen as intellectually curious, sensitive to
beauty, and willing to try new things. Imagination is positively associated with scale items
such as “I am full of ideas” and is negatively associated with scale items such as “I am
not interested in abstractions.” We use a standard 50 question scale, and Table 4 presents
summary statistics for our sample. Our results are within the typical range and are similar
to the results for a standard laboratory subject pool in our companion paper; Englmaier
17
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Table 4: Summary the personality traits of the subjects
Personality Factor Concepts Mean SD Min Max
Extraversion Sociability, seeks fulfillment from others 35.87 7.48 18 50
Agreeableness Adapting to suit others, politeness 41.64 4.48 32 50
Conscientiousness Honesty, rule following, diligence 34.59 6.46 19 50
Emotional Stability Calm, not easily upset 31.44 7.13 16 47
Imagination Seeks new experiences and intellectual pursuits 38.39 5.22 27 50
Participant summary statistics based on a standard 50 question Big 5 personality test administered
separately after the primary data entry task.
and Leider (2012b). For comparability between factors, in all of the analyses below we use
z-scores to standardize each factor.
In our study we identify subjects who score highly on the trait “agreeableness”, which had
been shown experimentally to relate to standard lab measures of reciprocity; cf. Ben-Ner,
Kong, and Putterman (2004) or Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes, and Jackson (1998). While
Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004) and Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes, and Jackson (1998)
also find some evidence that “openness” and “emotional stability” may relate to reciprocity
as well, the relationship between reciprocity and agreeableness was robust across specifica-
tion and sample. The results in Englmaier and Leider (2012b) also show this correlation.
Empirical evidence suggests that agreeable individuals not only reciprocate more, but are
also more trustworthy and altruistic. However, our model of reciprocal workers is to be
understood as an illustration of one particularly relevant motivational mechanism in our
context.
As opposed to the trust game or other lab measures of reciprocity, personality tests such
as the “Big 5” are quite common in the hiring practices of firms. In particular, high agree-
ableness corresponds with one of the criteria that Autor and Scarborough (2008) identify
in the hiring practice of the firm that they study, where the firm gave hiring preference to
applicants with positive z-scores for agreeableness, conscientiousness, and extroversion. The
separation of our subjects along the agreeableness dimension – which proxies for a split by
18
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reciprocity – allows us to examine whether our effects are in fact driven by the reciprocal
subjects, as is suggested by our model. Exploiting the population heterogeneity along the
reciprocity dimension and in doing so testing a key tenet of the reciprocity models was gen-
erally not done in early studies on gift–exchange. This was generally due to a lack of data
on the preference. Examples of more recent work that pays attention to this heterogeneity
and that finds support for heterogeneous treatments effects in line with reciprocity models
are Englmaier and Leider (2012b) and Cohn, Fehr, and Go¨tte (2015).
When we turn to the results of our study, first note that there is no correlation between our
agreeableness measure and the Typing Speed Test Score (Spearmen ρ = 0.0482, p = 0.7170).
Table 5 shows our basic regression analysis for the sample split into highly agreeable (strongly
reciprocal; top third) and low agreeable (weakly reciprocal; bottom two thirds) workers.18
Again, there are substantial differences in the response to the treatment variation across the
agreeableness dimension. The negative response to the wage gift in the No Bonus treatment
is driven entirely by the low agreeableness workers. Additionally, the low agreeableness
workers have no overall response to the wage gift in the Bonus treatment. However, note
that the complementarity effect between higher wage and manager bonus is significantly
positive and substantial for the low agreeableness group. While at first glance puzzling,
this result is in line with theoretical arguments and empirical findings in Englmaier and
Leider (2012b) and Englmaier, Strasser, and Winter (2014): Intuitively, low–agreeableness
workers are not (necessarily) unresponsive to gift exchange; however, they need a bigger
boost to react – as is provided by giving both the wage gift and the improved ability to
reciprocate by the manager bonus. In contrast, high–agreeableness workers react already
to either one in separation as indicated by the (admittedly noisily estimated) coefficients in
the regressions. These high–agreeableness workers have also a significantly positive response
in the Bonus treatment (indicated by the significant total effect reported at the bottom of
Table 5.) Therefore, high–agreeableness workers can be induced to exert significantly more
18The qualitative results are robust to using different cut offs for classifying subjects as highly agreeable.
Directly interacting the continuous agreeableness score with the interactions of interests is somewhat too
demanding given our sample size.
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Table 5: Regression: Performance (10–min. Periods) by Agreeableness Score
Data Entry Accuracy
Rate Corrected Rate
Low Agr. High Agr. Low Agr. High Agr.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Typing–Speed Test Score 0.226*** 0.0590 0.188*** 0.0770
(0.0502) (0.0531) (0.0490) (0.0500)
Temps Paid High Wage ($18/hr) -4.142** 2.392 -4.294*** 2.159
(1.681) (2.675) (1.614) (2.535)
Manager Bonus -0.377 4.856 -0.167 4.224
(1.799) (3.004) (1.745) (2.870)
High Wage X Manager Bonus 5.380** 2.041 5.222** 1.332
(2.495) (2.676) (2.408) (2.562)
Period 0.0819* 0.134** 0.0522 0.0898*
(0.0433) (0.0553) (0.0419) (0.0527)
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES
Constant 16.94** 67.05*** 12.65* 58.30***
(7.113) (14.76) (6.775) (13.93)
Observations 1059 569 1059 569
Number of subjects 37 20 37 20
Total Effect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 1.237 4.433** 0.927 3.491*
(1.598) (2.165) (1.560) (2.058)
“Agr.” abbreviates “Agreeableness”. Highly Agreeable subjects are those with an agreeableness score in
the top 33%. We report cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure
and AR(1) correlation. Demographic controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work
experience, and student status. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
effort than the control low–wage treatment; but they have in some sense a more gradual
reaction to the changes in the work setting as compared to low agreeableness workers who
react primarily to the combination of high wage and manager bonus. Overall, our results
are consistent with our model that a response to a wage gift should come primarily from
reciprocal workers. What remains puzzling is the strong negative effect of the wage gift
among the low –agreeableness subjects. We will return to this topic in Section 5.
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Treatment Effects over Time
Finally, we consider the question of how productivity evolves over time. As Gneezy and List
(2006) document a fast disappearing gift–exchange pattern, we are in particular interested in
how the effects of the treatment variations evolve over the course of the experiment. We split
our data into first– and second–half observations and report in Table 6 the base regressions
separately. Again, the qualitative results are robust to different divisions of the data.19 For
both treatments the effect of a wage gift has in fact a more positive effect in the second
half of the experiment. The negative response to the wage in the No Bonus treatment only
exists in the first half; it disappears in the second half. Similarly, the positive effect in the
Bonus treatment is present only in the second half of the experiment. However, the strong
complementarity between the treatments – High Wage X Manager Bonus – is very stable
over time. This suggests that the positive response to gift–exchange does not have to be a
short-lived phenomenon.
5 Discussion of the Results
Previous experiments on gift–exchange in the field studied a variety of job situations (e.g.,
one-time jobs versus ongoing jobs); job tasks (e.g., data entry, fund raising, and tree plant-
ing); and worker pools (e.g., students versus full-time employees). Our results suggest that it
may not be surprising that the observed effect of surprise wage increases varies across these
studies.20
We demonstrate that a positive gift–exchange can exist, but that its presence depends on
the characteristics of the job. Therefore we should not expect gift–exchange to be present
in all job settings. In particular, the results from our field study suggest that the extent
to which the manager will directly benefit when subordinates produce high output plays an
19E.g., performing an hourly based analysis gives similar results.
20Kessler (2013) and Esteves-Sorenson (2018) are two careful and comprehensive papers that explicitly try
to explain the heterogeneous treatment effects in the various extant studies. Moreover, they examine other
characteristics of the work setting that determine the effectiveness of reciprocity-based incentives.
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Table 6: Regression: Performance (10–min. Periods) by 1st/2nd half
Data Entry Accuracy
Rate Corrected Rate
1st Half 2nd Half 1st Half 2nd Half
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Typing–Speed Test Score 0.216*** 0.258*** 0.200*** 0.241***
(0.0320) (0.0360) (0.0299) (0.0341)
Temps Paid High Wage ($18/hr) -4.795*** -1.527 -4.319*** -1.581
(1.226) (1.521) (1.183) (1.423)
Manager Bonus -0.572 -1.249 -0.429 -0.460
(1.407) (1.856) (1.371) (1.778)
High Wage X Manager Bonus 5.249*** 5.406** 4.823*** 4.531**
(1.902) (2.334) (1.823) (2.237)
Period 0.578*** -0.372*** 0.532*** -0.430***
(0.0656) (0.0984) (0.0630) (0.0930)
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES
Constant 15.91*** 25.27*** 10.67* 17.19**
(5.914) (7.458) (5.673) (7.022)
Observations 855 773 855 773
Number of subjects 57 57 57 57
Total Effect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 0.453 3.878** 0.504 2.949*
(1.324) (1.623) (1.287) (1.537)
We report cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure and AR(1)
correlation. Demographic Controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and
student status. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p <0.1
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important role for the efficacy of reciprocity and gift–exchange in the field. We therefore
anticipate that gift–exchange should be most prominent in settings where managers have a
strong direct benefit from employee effort, e.g. if they have performance-based monetary
incentives. An analysis of the UK Workplace Employment Relations Study (WERS) by
Englmaier, Kolaska, and Leider (2016) finds some support for this. Now with increasingly
better available representative administrative data on HR practices it would be interesting
to further study the richer predictions of reciprocity–based models for organizational design;
cf. Englmaier and Leider (2012a).
The negative effect on effort in our No Bonus treatment is puzzling. It is possible that
absent an indication that high effort is important to the manager the surprise high wage
appears wasteful. Subjects might interpret the out-of-context wage increase as a mistake on
our side, which would cast doubt on our managerial aptitude. From this they might have
downwards updated also our ability or willingness to “monitor their work”. This indicates
that the manager who has incentives that are related to output may put the decision to offer
a higher wage into context and avoid this negative updating on aptitude.
While we did not ex ante predict that the effect of a gift would get stronger over time, a
few explanations are possible: First, we observe some level of learning in all treatments. It
may take some time before workers learn their cost of effort, which determines how willing
they are to exert effort to provide a return gift to the principal. Additionally, perhaps
gift–exchange raises productivity by increasing persistence, rather than maximal effort. As
previously mentioned, we see no treatment effect on quality, which suggests that workers
need not improve on all dimensions of effort. Last, workers may have been waiting to see if
another surprise was coming before completely determining their effort level.
As in previous experiments – see for example DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, and Rao (2016)
– we do not find that the increase in worker wages “pays for itself” in increased productivity:
the 40% increase in wage garnered only a 10% increase in productivity. However, we were
using completely flat wages to pay the workers. The theoretical model in Englmaier and
Leider (2012a) suggests that the level of reciprocity that is needed to induce effort under
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a flat wage is generally larger than the amount of reciprocity that can reduce agency costs
when paired with explicit monetary incentives. A flat wage is generically far from the optimal
contract, and so it is quite possible that any given level of reciprocity could be much more
powerfully leveraged with a more sophisticated incentive scheme. Bellemare and Shearer
(2009) find that a fixed gift of $80 ( 40% of earnings) on top of the standard piece rate
increased productivity by an amount worth $40. As in our study the size of the gift was
chosen arbitrarily; hence fine tuning the mix of gifts and explicit incentives is likely to be
critical. Going forward, establishing that gift–exchange works not only conceptually, but
also can be profit–enhancing is one of the key challenges for this literature.
6 Conclusion
The importance of fairness and social preferences – especially for the work relationship –
has long been documented in the lab. However, a number of studies have highlighted that
the empirical importance of reciprocity as a motivating force in the field crucially depends
on details of the environment. The wage gift has to stand in the proper context to generate
a motivating effect. Based on a principal–agent model of reciprocal motivation, we argue
that a key determinant of the efficiency of reciprocal motivation is the ability of an agent to
repay a gift: The benefit accrues to the principal from high effort.
Our results confirm the importance of the specific characteristics of the job–setting in gen-
erating gift–exchange-based incentives. If the manager stands to benefit much from addi-
tional effort, there is a strong positive effort response; while in the absence of the managerial
benefit, we find no or even a negative response to the wage gift. This indicates a strong
complementarity between the wage gift and the managerial payoff in generating incentives
for employee effort.
Additionally, we find that the positive response to high wages comes primarily from high–
reciprocity workers (as identified by a personality test), while the negative response comes
from low–reciprocity workers. We find no weakening of positive responses to wage gifts over
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time. To the contrary, any negative effects of the wage gift disappear in the later stages of
the task and we find an overall strongly positive effect of our treatment manipulations.
Our study indicates that employing agents’ reciprocity as a part of a firm’s personnel pol-
icy is a viable alternative and can be successfully done. However, as highlighted by, e.g.,
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) or Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2012), it is important that
various complementary parts of the firm’s compensation and HR policy are coordinated to
maximize the effect of reciprocity. For example, firms that wish to employ reciprocal incen-
tives may want to select for reciprocal motivations during hiring. An interesting implication
of our study is that performance–related pay for middle management should be part of a
remuneration policy even absent moral–hazard problems at that hierarchy level.
Our results suggest several avenues for future research: Further empirical work could
identify the optimal magnitude of the gift and the proper mix between reciprocal and explicit
motivation to maximize the profitability of gift–exchange.
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A Additional Material
Figure C.1: Example Page Prussian Census of 1849
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B Derivations
B.1 Comparative Statics
Assuming that the contract is generous, the worker’s optimal effort choice a∗ for a given
contract is implicitly defined by the first order condition
∂U (w˜, a, aˆ)
∂a
= −c′(a∗) + η (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯)M · ER′(a∗) = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem we can derive the relevant comparative statics
w.r.t. w˜ and M :
∂2U (w˜, a, aˆ)
∂a2
= −c′′(a∗) + η (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯)M · ER′′(a∗) < 0
∂2U (w˜, a, aˆ)
∂a∂M
= η (u(w˜)− c(aˆ)− u¯)ER′(a∗) > 0
∂2U (w˜, a, aˆ)
∂a∂w˜
= ηM · u′(w˜) · ER′′(a∗) > 0
Hence it follows that
∂a∗
∂M
= −
∂2U(w˜,a,aˆ)
∂a∂M
∂2U(w˜,a,aˆ)
∂a2
> 0,
∂a∗
∂w˜
= −
∂2U(w˜,a,aˆ)
∂a∂w˜
∂2U(w˜,a,aˆ)
∂a2
> 0, and
∂2a∗
∂M∂w
> 0.
B.2 A simple Example
To provide a concrete example assume that
ER(a) = a, u(w˜) = w˜, and c(a) =
a2
2
.
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Then the worker’s utility can be written as
U (w˜, a, aˆ) = w˜ −
a2
2
+ η
(
w˜ −
aˆ2
2
− u¯
)
M (a− w˜) ,
the first order condition is given by
−a+ η
(
w˜ −
aˆ2
2
− u¯
)
M = 0,
and can be rearranged to explicitly define a∗
a∗ = η
(
w˜ −
aˆ2
2
− u¯
)
M.
Now taking explicit derivatives gives
∂a∗
∂M
= η
(
w˜ −
aˆ2
2
− u¯
)
> 0,
∂a∗
∂w˜
= ηM > 0, and
∂2a∗
∂M∂w˜
= η > 0.
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C Additional Analysis
Table C.1: Regression: Performance (10 min. Periods) incl. Ability Dummies
(1) (2)
Data Entry Accuracy
VARIABLES Rate Corrected Rate
Slowest Third -5.451*** -4.836***
(0.987) (0.945)
Fastest Third -0.407 -0.191
(1.075) (1.038)
Temps Paid High Wage -3.541*** -3.324***
(1.131) (1.074)
Manager Bonus -2.506* -1.875
(1.340) (1.294)
High Wage X Manager Bonus 7.853*** 7.048***
(1.700) (1.633)
Period 0.122*** 0.0867**
(0.0369) (0.0354)
Demographic Controls YES YES
Constant 15.94*** 10.35**
(5.488) (5.236)
Observations 1628 1628
Number of subjects 57 57
Total Effect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 4.312*** 3.724**
(1.215) (1.177)
We report cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure and
panel-specific AR(1) correlation. Demographic Controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age,
work experience, and student status. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted:
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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